# Notification of a Proposal to issue an Airworthiness Directive

**PAD No.: 25-139**

**Issued: 08 September 2025**

Note: This Proposed Airworthiness Directive (PAD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that Regulation.

In accordance with the EASA Continuing Airworthiness Procedures, the Executive Director is proposing the issuance of an EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD), applicable to the aeronautical product(s) identified below.
All interested persons may send their comments, referencing the PAD Number above, to the e-mail address specified in the 'Remarks' section, prior to the consultation date indicated.

**Design Approval Holder's Name:**
AIRBUS HELICOPTERS

**Type/Model designation(s):**
SA 365, AS 365 and EC 155 helicopters

Effective Date: [TBD - standard: 14 days after AD issue date]

TCDS Number(s): EASA.R.105

Foreign AD: Not applicable

Supersedure: This AD supersedes EASA AD 2024-0110 dated 06 June 2024.

## ATA 67 – Rotors Flight Controls – Upper Ball Bearing End of the Main Rotor Servo-Controls – Inspection

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**Manufacturer(s):**
Airbus Helicopters (AH), formerly Eurocopter (EC), Eurocopter France, Aerospatiale, Sud Aviation

**Applicability:**
SA 365 N, SA 365 N1, AS 365 N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155 B and EC 155 B1 helicopters, all serial numbers.

**Definitions:**
For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:

**The ASB:** AH Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) AS365-67-30-0001 Revision 03, or ASB EC155-67-30-0001 Revision 04, as applicable.

**The lock-washer**: Lock-washer (reference 365A27-8193-20 for EC 155 helicopters; reference 360A27-2121-20 for SA 365 and AS 365 helicopters) under the nut of the upper ball bearing end of each of the three main rotor servo-controls.

## Reason:

Two occurrences have been reported of loss of tightening torque between the upper ball bearing end and main rotor servo-control. One case led to the disconnection of these two parts. Further investigations identified paint on the lock-washer as the root cause.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to disconnection of the upper ball bearing end and main rotor servo-control, possibly resulting in loss of control of the helicopter.

To address this potential unsafe condition, AH issued ASB AS365-67-30-0001 and ASB EC155-67-30-0001, both at Revision 01, to provide inspection instructions. Consequently, EASA issued AD 2024-0110 to require a one-time inspection of the connection between the upper ball bearing end and main rotor servo-control and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action(s).

Since that AD was issued, and pending certification of a design change, AH issued the ASB, as defined in this AD, introducing additional inspections of the main rotor servo-controls nut torque.

For the reason described above, this AD retains the requirements of EASA 2024-0110, which is superseded, and requires additional inspection of the main rotor servo-controls nut torque.

This AD is still considered to be an interim action and further AD action may follow.

## Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):

Required as indicated by this AD, unless the action(s) required by this AD have been already accomplished:

**Inspection(s)**:

(1) Before exceeding 110 flight hours (FH) or within 6 months, whichever occurs first after 20 June 2024 [the effective date of EASA AD 2024-0110], check the nut tightening torque of the upper ball bearing end for each of the three main rotor servo-controls in accordance with the instructions of the ASB.

(2) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (1) of this AD, discrepancies, as identified in the ASB, were/are detected, before exceeding 110 FH after the effective date of this AD, check the nut tightening torque of the upper ball bearing end for each of the affected main rotor servo-controls in accordance with the instructions of the ASB.

(3) If, after 20 June 2024 [the effective date of EASA AD 2024-0110] but before the effective date of this AD, any lock washer was replaced on a helicopter, before exceeding 110 FH after the effective date of this AD inspect the nut tightening torque of the upper ball bearing end for each of the affected main rotor servo-controls in accordance with the instructions of the ASB.

(4) From the effective date of this AD, if a lock-washer is replaced on a helicopter, before exceeding 10 FH but not before accumulating 3 FH after lock-washer replacement, inspect the nut tightening torque of the upper ball bearing end for each of the affected main rotor servo-controls in accordance with the instructions of the ASB.

**Corrective Action(s)**:

(5) If, during any inspection as required by paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of this AD, discrepancies, as identified in the ASB, are detected:

(5.1) Before next flight, accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in accordance with the instructions of the ASB; and

(5.2) Before exceeding 10 FH but not before accumulating 3 FH after the accomplishment of the corrective action(s) as required by paragraph (5.1) of this AD, inspect the nut tightening torque of the upper ball bearing end for each of the affected main rotor servo-controls in accordance with the instructions of the ASB.

(6) If, during the inspection as required by paragraph (4), (5.2) or (6.2) of this AD, as applicable, unless otherwise stated by paragraph (7) of this AD, discrepancies, as identified in the ASB, are detected:

(6.1) Before next flight, accomplish the applicable corrective action(s) in accordance with the instructions of the ASB; and

(6.2) Before exceeding 10 FH but not before accumulating 3 FH after the accomplishment of the corrective action(s) as required by paragraph (6.1) of this AD, inspect the nut tightening torque of the upper ball bearing end for each of the affected main rotor servo-controls in accordance with the instructions of the ASB.

(7) If, during three consecutive inspections as required by paragraph (4), (5.2) or (6.2) of this AD, as applicable, discrepancies, as identified in the ASB, are detected, before next flight after the third inspection, contact AH for approved repair instructions and, within the compliance time specified therein, accomplish those instructions accordingly.

**Credit:**

(8) Inspections and corrective action(s) accomplished on a helicopter before the effective date of this AD in accordance with the instructions of AH ASB AS365-67-30-0001 Revision 01 or Revision 02, or ASB EC155-67-30-0001 Revision 01 or Revision 02, as applicable, are acceptable to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (5.1) of this AD for that helicopter.

**Reporting:**

(9) Within 7 days after the inspection as required by paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of this AD report the inspection results (including no findings) to AH. Using the inspection report attached to the ASB is an acceptable method to comply with this requirement.

**Ref. Publications:**

Airbus Helicopters ASB AS365-67-30-0001 Revision 01 dated 18 April 2024, or Revision 02 dated 15 May 2024, or Revision 03 dated 21 May 2025.

Airbus Helicopters ASB EC155-67-30-0001 Revision 01 dated 18 April 2024 or Revision 02 dated 15 May 2024, or Revision 04 dated 18 June 2025.

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned documents is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

**Remarks:**

1. This Proposed AD will be closed for consultation on 06 October 2025.

2. Enquiries regarding this PAD should be referred to the EASA Safety Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.

3. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this PAD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this PAD, can be reported to the EU aviation safety reporting system. This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than those covered by the design to which this PAD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or other modification.

4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this PAD, please contact: Airbus Helicopters (Technical Support) – Aéroport de Marseille Provence, 13725 Marignane Cedex, France, Telephone: +33 (4) 42 85 97 97, Fax: +33 (4) 42 85 99 66, Web portal: https://airbusworld.helicopters.airbus.com Technical Requests Management, or E-mail: TechnicalSupport.Helicopters@airbus.com